On Temporal Regulations and Commitment Protocols by Marengo, E. et al.
On Temporal Regulations and Commitment Protocols
Elisa Marengo, Matteo Baldoni, and Cristina Baroglio
Dipartimento di Informatica, Universita` degli Studi di Torino
{emarengo, baldoni, baroglio}@di.unito.it
Abstract
The proposal of Elisa Marengo’s thesis is to extend
commitment protocols in order to (i) allow for ex-
pressing commitments to temporal regulations, and
(ii) to supply a tool for expressing laws, conven-
tions and the like, in order to specify legal interac-
tions. These two aspects will be deeply investigated
in the proposal of a unified framework. This pro-
posal is part of ongoing work that will be included
in the thesis.
1 Commitment Protocols: Strengths and
Shortcomings
The issues of communication and cooperation are crucial in
the area of Multiagent systems (MAS). The common solu-
tion is to rely on agent interaction protocols. Among dif-
ferent proposals, commitment protocols [Singh, 1999] have
been widely adopted. All agents involved in an interaction
ruled by a commitment protocol share the semantics of a set
of actions which affect the social state. Semantics is based on
the notion of social commitment. The idea is that if an agent
takes a commitment towards another agent to bring about a
condition, then, it will behave in such a way to fulfill the en-
gagement sooner or later. In this respect, commitment proto-
cols have a deontic nature, because a commitment introduces
a social expectation on the responsibility of some agent to-
wards some other agent to perform something or to achieve
some result. Commitment protocols suit well open MAS be-
cause they are respectful of the agents’ autonomy, since no
introspections to the agents’ mental states is required; they
are dynamic because commitments can be created, released,
deleted and suchlike, and they are flexible because agents are
free to take advantage of opportunities or to follow shortcuts.
Commitment protocols have fundamentally changed the
process of protocol specification from a procedural approach
(i.e., prescribing how an interaction is to be executed) to a
declarative one (i.e., describing what interaction is to take
place) [Winikoff et al., 2005]. However, in many practical
situations it is necessary to express some hints on how the in-
teraction should evolve. This does not mean going back to
procedural approaches, but it means reconsidering the how.
In particular, it could be necessary to express commitments
to temporal regulations and to represent legal patterns of in-
teraction. Temporal regulations are needed to express com-
mitments to achieve something and in a specified order. For
instance, an insurance company commits to paying an in-
network surgeon for a procedure only after a covered patient
has undergone the procedure. Patterns of interaction, instead,
can capture conventions, laws, preferences, habits, or rules
that, in general, constrain a certain reality. For example, in
the context of a democratic assembly, a participant cannot
speak if she has not obtained the floor.
The thesis focuses on these lacks, by proposing an exten-
sion of commitment protocols. The proposal (i) extends the
regulative nature of commitments with the possibility of ex-
plicitly committing to temporal regulations, and (ii) supplies
a way for expressing patterns of interaction, capturing laws,
conventions and whatever constrain the interaction. Until
now, these are two disjoint solutions for two different prob-
lems. The final step of the thesis will be to investigate the
correlations among the two and to propose a unified frame-
work.
2 Temporal Regulations and Commitment
Protocols
Commitments have a regulative nature in the sense that the
debtor is bound to the creditor to make the condition in the
commitment become true. However, it is often necessary to
specify patterns of interaction and temporal regulations which
require a degree of expressiveness that commitments alone do
not have.
The first step in this direction is described in [Marengo et
al., 2011] and consists in a new formalization of commit-
ments where temporal regulations are incorporated as con-
tent of the commitments. In this way regulations assume a
normative force which is due to the regulative nature of com-
mitments. For example, the commitment C(x, y,, a · b)
expresses the engagement of x towards y to make a and b
happens and in the given order. Participants to the interac-
tion will be able to guide their actions locally, in order to not
violate any commitment they have taken, and to judge the
compliance of their counterparties. Indeed, since regulations
are placed inside commitments, the debtor will be considered
responsible and thus liable for any violation. For this reason
it becomes fundamental for an agent to establish, before tak-
2824
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ing a commitment, if it has the sufficient support by the other
agents. The elements the agent has to consider are both the
set of actions it can perform and the cooperations it can get
from the others, via the set of commitment of which it is the
creditor. To this aim, we formalized the notions of control
and safety. The former captures the capability, for an agent,
to bring about a regulation. It depends on the actions a certain
agent can perform and on commitments directed towards it.
The latter is strictly related to the notion of control: a com-
mitment is safe if its debtor has established sufficient control
to guarantee being able to discharge it.
Even though commitment to temporal regulations allows
to make some assumptions on how the interaction should
evolve, they are not sufficient to express general rules like
norms or conventions. For example, it is not possible to ex-
press that, in a democratic assembly, a participant has to ob-
tain the floor before speaking, otherwise it will be sanctioned.
However, this rule do not impose to a participant to make a
question. Norms usually express permissions and prohibi-
tions that basically restrict the legal evolutions of the social
state. In order to capture these patterns of interaction, the so-
lution described in [Baldoni et al., 2010b] relies on Searle’s
definition of a social reality [Searle, 1995]. In particular, he
identifies a constitutive and a regulative specification. The
former defines a set of actions as foundational of a certain
context. In commitment protocols this corresponds to the ac-
tions’ semantics, given in terms of effects on the social state.
The latter, instead, captures how things should be carried
on. This aspect is currently missing in commitment proto-
col specification. The thesis proposes an explicit definition
of the regulative specification, given in a declarative way by
means of a set of constraints expressed in Linear-time Tem-
poral Logic (LTL). The choice of a declarative representation
of constraints allows for the specification of what is manda-
tory and what is forbidden for a protocol. This is similar, in
the aim, to what conventions, laws, contractual obligations
and rules in general capture.
3 Ongoing Work
The two proposed solutions allow facing two different lacks
of commitment protocols related to temporal regulations and
patterns of interaction. The thesis will finally investigate a
unified framework in which both aspects can be reconciled.
This framework will allow agents to commit to complex con-
ditions, providing them the tools necessary to verify their ca-
pability to fulfill the engagements. This can be done thanks
to the notions of control and of safety. Moreover, it will allow
for the specification of a set of norms, conventions, rules that
have to be respected throughout the interaction. Before tak-
ing part to an interaction agents can determine if, given this
set of constraints, they will be able to reach their goals.
The aim of reconciling these two aspects, however, is mo-
tivated by another important point. Indeed, these two kinds
of temporal regulations are strictly connected to one another
[Baldoni et al., 2011]. In particular, a set of norms restricts
the set of commitments that can be taken by the agents and
that are not in contrast with the constraints. For example, be-
fore getting on a train a person has to punch the ticket first.
Only after, she is allowed to travel on the train. However,
think to a person that commits to travel to her destination first
and, once she reached it, to punch the ticket. In this situa-
tion, it is impossible for the person to fulfill her commitment
without violating the norm. More generally, in order to pro-
pose a unified framework some important questions have to
be answered. For example, given a set of norms expressed in
terms of patterns of interaction, how can we establish which
commitments are compliant and which are incompatible? If
norms change, how do these changes affect the set of com-
mitments? Moreover, how can one monitor the interaction of
the agents and discover violations? In this respect, a solutions
could be to lean on e-institutions. In [Baldoni et al., 2010a]
an initial proposal is described, where the idea is to define
specific artifacts able to detect agents’ violations.
Another important field in which the described proposal
can find application is that of business process representa-
tions. In this area the trend is currently evolving to consider
declarative representations for non-sequential processes. We
plan to investigate more deeply these aspects in the line of
[Telang and Singh, 2009].
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